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Based upon these decisions, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant who reinitiated a con-
versation with police only minutes after he invoked his right to
counsel, by stating that he was aware of his rights but wished to
proceed with the interrogation without counsel, effectively
waived his right to the assistance of counsel. 93
7
More recently, the United States Supreme Court reinforced its
decisions in Minnick v. Mississippi.938 In Minnick, the Court
stated that, "Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth
Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, pro-
vided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions
with the authorities . "...-939 Thus, on the federal level, a defen-
dant is capable of waiving the right to counsel subsequent to his
or her invocation of the right if she or he initiates further com-
munication.
While the federal rule allows for waiver of the right to counsel
when initiated by the defendant, such initiation will only be a
factor on the state level in determining whether a defendant ac-
tually intended to waive the right to counsel. Provided the de-
fendant does intend to waive his or her right to counsel, an attor-
ney has not yet entered the case, and proceedings have not begun,
the defendant does have the power, on the state level, to revoke
his or her prior request and waive the right to counsel. Therefore,
it is clear that a criminal suspect does have the power on the fed-
eral and state level to waive his or her right to counsel.
People v. Bing940
(decided July 2, 1990)
Three defendants were prosecuted separately for crimes unre-
936. Id.
937. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1988).
938. 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
939. Id. at 492.
940. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990); see
Comment, Interaction Between State and Federal Right to Counsel: The
Overruling ofBartolomeo, 8 TouRo L. REv. 191 (1991).
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lated to prior pending charges for which they had been repre-
sented. On appeal, each contended that interpretation of article I,
section 6 of the New York State Constitution, as evidenced by
People v. Bartolomeo,941 required suppression of incriminating
statements about the current charge despite voluntary waiver of
the right to counsel with respect to that charge. In contrast to the
state court interpretation of the right to counsel, 942 United States
Supreme Court interpretation of the federal right to counsel does
not go so far as to impute an earlier request for counsel to a
subsequent, separate arrest on an unrelated charge when the
defendant voluntarily waives the right to counsel on that
charge. 943 As a result, the defendants in the case at hand relied
941. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981) (holding
that a suspect, represented by counsel on a prior pending charge, may not
waive his rights in the absence of counsel and answer questions on a new,
unrelated charge in the context of a separate arrest).
942. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6 ("In any trial in any court whatever the
person accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel as in civil actions .... ") (emphasis added).
Additionally, New York State courts protect defendants during the
investigatory stage of criminal proceedings by not only forbidding further
questioning once an accused requests or retains counsel but by finding that any
waiver in the absence of counsel at this point is invalid. See, e.g., People v.
Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (a
request for counsel as well as retention of counsel bars further interrogation in
the absence of counsel) (emphasis added); People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167,
397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979) (once a defendant retains an
attorney, he may not be questioned in the absence of counsel about the initial
crime or any other unrelated matters); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239
N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968) (once an attorney enters a proceeding,
police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless he
waives his right to counsel with his attorney present); People v. Donovan, 13
N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) (statements will be
suppressed that are obtained after an attorney's request to see his client has
been denied or a client's request to see his attorney has been denied).
943. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.").
The Supreme Court created a fifth amendment right to counsel during
custodial interrogation in an effort to protect the right against compelled self-
incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-44 (1966).
If an accused requests counsel during custodial interrogation, all questioning,
including questioning about unrelated matters, must cease. See Edwards v.
398 [Vol 8
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solely on the expansive state guarantee.
Upon consolidated appeals, 944 the New York Court of
Appeals expressly overruled Bartolomeo.945 It held that the
defendants who had each been represented by counsel on prior
pending unrelated charges were not deprived of rights to counsel
under the state constitution. 946 This was true because in the
absence of counsel, defendants waived their Miranda rights947
and voluntarily responded to police interrogation concerning
matters unrelated to the prior pending charge. 948
Defendant Bing was suspected of a New York burglary.
Although police were aware of a pending charge in Ohio, they
failed to inquire about representation on that charge. However,
defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel on the New
York charge and thereafter made incriminating statements about
that crime. 949
Relying on Bartolomeo, the defendant moved to suppress the
statements claiming that the earlier representation on the pending
charge barred waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). However, questioning may be continued in the
absence of counsel if the accused initiates further communication with police.
Id. at 484-85.
944. The court of appeals consolidated People v. Cawley, 150 A.D.2d 994,
542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (lst Dep't 1989), rev'd, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d
1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990), People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 541
N.Y.S.2d 355 (1st Dep't 1989), aft'd, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990), and People v. Bing, 146 A.D.2d 178, 540 N.Y.S.2d
247, (2d Dep't 1989), aft'd, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d
474 (1990).
945. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
See People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d
894 (1981).
946. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 349-50, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
485.
947. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court
established a set of procedural safeguards to protect the individual during
custodial interrogation by stating: "Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
948. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 351, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
949. Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
1991] 399
3
et al.: Right to Counsel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
counsel. 950 Both courts below, however, agreed with the
prosecution's insistence on recognition of an out-of-state
limitation to the Bartolomeo rule and denied suppression. 951
Defendant Cawley was arraigned for a New York robbery and
was released on bail pending trial. He thereafter jumped bail but
was returned six months later on a bench warrant. Upon in-
terrogation by police officers who were unaware of his prior rep-
resentation, defendant voluntarily made inculpatory statements
about new, unrelated criminal conduct. 952
The trial court suppressed the statements finding that the earlier
representation barred waiver of the right to counsel in the absence
of counsel. Similarly, the appellate division rejected the prosecu-
tor's position calling for an exception to the Bartolomeo rule
where the prior attorney-client relationship is tenuous at best. 953
In defendant Medina's case, an investigating homicide detective
spoke to the defendant about two murders which had been
committed in the defendant's neighborhood. During the conver-
sation, the detective learned that the defendant had recently been
released from jail after having been held on an assault charge.
When the detective inquired about the disposition of that charge,
the defendant replied he had been "let go" because the complain-
ing witnesses had failed to appear on four occasions. 954 The de-
tective assumed the prior case had been dismissed, and proceeded
to arrest the defendant on suspicion of committing the
neighborhood murders. Later at the police station, the defendant
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and uttered inculpatory
statements.
The defendant made a pre-trial motion to suppress such state-
ments claiming that because of his prior representation on the
pending charge, waiver of his right to counsel on the new unre-
950. Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476. Under
Bartolomeo the right to counsel attaches indelibly upon representation on the
prior pending charge. This right cannot then be waived in the absence of
counsel. Id.
951. Id.
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lated charge was impermissible absent an attorney's presence. 955
The trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding it was rea-
sonable to believe the prior charge had been dismissed. 956 On ap-
peal, the appellate division affirmed. 957 The district attorney
urged the court of appeals to overrule Bartolomeo.95 8
The court found it necessary to overrule Bartolomeo despite the
compelling concerns of stare decisis.959 It was determined that
the appeals before the court aptly demonstrated the
"unworkability" of the Bartolomeo rule and the unacceptable
burden it placed on law enforcement. 960 Additionally, the court
found that recognition of further exceptions to the rule would
undermine its rationale. 961
The first section of the court's decision explained the principle
and emphasized the importance of stare decisis in our legal sys-
tem. 962 However, it also advocated the necessity of overruling
prior decisions when persuaded by the "lessons of experience and
the force of better reasoning. " 963 The court concluded that the
overruling of Bartolomeo "was consistent with these principles
and required as a matter of sound policy. " 964
The second section of the decision provides an analysis of the
right to counsel in New York as it existed prior to the Bartolomeo
decision. 965 The court identified two well-defined situations in
955. Id.
956. Id. The trial court "also denied the defendant's trial motion to submit
the issue of voluntariness of his statements to the jury." Id.
957. Id. at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476. See People v.
Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1st Dep't 1989) (two justices
dissented finding that the voluntariness of the statements would have been
submitted to the jury).
958. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
959. Id. at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
960. Id.
961. Id.
962. Id. at 337-38, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
963. Id. at 338, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (quoting Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
964. Id.
965. "There are two well-defined situations in which the right to counsel is
said to attach indelibly... and a waiver, notwithstanding the client's right to
1991] 401
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which the right to counsel attaches indelibly under the state con-
stitution thereby making a waiver in the absence of counsel im-
permissible. The first situation relates to elicitation of waivers
after commencement of formal proceeding. 966 The second situa-
tion relates to custodial interrogation of uncharged individuals in
custody who have retained or requested counsel. 967
The court explicitly recognized the importance of attorney rep-
resentation in the area of waiver of the right to counsel as a shield
against the coercive nature of the state mechanism. 968 However,
waive generally, will not be recognized unless made in the presence of
counsel." Id. at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
Both the federal court and the state court interpret the right to counsel to
attach indelibly after the commencement of formal proceedings. See Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (interpreting the sixth amendment right to
counsel to be commenced at indictment); People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218,
400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980) (court held filing of a felony
complaint commenced formal proceedings); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162,
182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962) (court held that statements made
after arraignment yet before indictment should be granted the same protection
as post-indictment statements).
However, only the New York courts have recognized a per se rule barring
interrogation of uncharged individuals in custody or waiver of the right to
counsel by these individuals in the absence counsel. Compare Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 475 (1966) (waiver would be allowed as long as it is
found to be knowing and intelligent) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1981) (a request for counsel bars further interrogation unless the
accused initiates further communication with the police) with People v. Arthur,
22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666(1968)
(once an attorney enters the proceeding, an individual may not be questioned
outside the attorney's presence unless the individual waives his right in front
of his attorney).
966. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478
(citing, inter alia, People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424
N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980)).
967. Id. (citing, inter alia, People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d
894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976)).
968. Id. at 339-40, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478. The court
stated:
Underlying all these considerations is a recognition of the imbalance
between a suspect and the agents of the State, the coercive influences the
State may bring to bear on one suspected of a crime and
acknowledgment that a party who has expressed the inability to deal
402 [Vol 8
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the court also emphasized that, in the past, such protection did
not necessarily extend to "exclusion of statements made to police
. . . about crimes unrelated to those on which the suspect had
representation." 969 Additionally, they noted that a prior pending
criminal case in which the defendant's right to counsel had
attached did not bar the police from questioning the defendant
unless he was actually represented on the prior charge. 970
The third section of the opinion provides an overview of the
Bartolomeo rule and the problems it created for the courts. The
rule required that police refrain from questioning a suspect about
the pending charge on which the right to counsel had attached
and also about a new, unrelated charge for which the defendant
waived his right to counsel. 971 The court framed a number of
questions which were left unanswered by the Bartolomeo deci-
sion. 972 It concluded that such failure subsequently led to uneven
application of the rule and "destabiliz[ation]... [of] the right to
with those forces without legal help is entitled to have help available
without State interference.
Id. (citing People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422
N.Y.S.2d 18, 22 (1979)).
969. Id. at 340, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478. (citing, inter
alia, People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1971) (limiting the scope of the attorney's representation to the specific
matters for which he was retained).
970 See, e.g., People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438
N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981) (defendant's right to counsel was not violated by
subjecting him to a lie detector test to which he consented since he was not in
fact represented on the prior charge).
971. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 229, 423 N.E.2d at 373, 440 N.Y.S.2d at
897.
972. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 341-42, 558 N.E.2d at 1016-17, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
479. The court stated that:
If the rule created a remedy to protect only rights in the pending case
and not on the new charge, why was not exclusion solely in the pending
case adequate protection? Conversely, if exclusion was required to
protect an independent right to counsel with respect to the new crime,
there was not explanation of why Rogers should be expanded so
dramatically to protect a suspect against self-incrimination on the new
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counsel in general." 973 Accordingly, the court noted, subsequent
court decisions were aimed at limiting the scope of the rule in or-
der to restore the necessary balance between law enforcement and
defendant protection. 9
74
In the fourth section of the opinion, the court once again turned
to the cases at hand, and rejected the practicability of recognizing
the exceptions to Bartolomeo that were presented. 975 In all three
cases, the defendants had counsel on the prior pending charges.
However, despite police knowledge of the pending charge, no in-
quiry as to representation was made. 976 It was noted that such
cases would fall squarely within the Bartolomeo rubric. 977
While the court seemed sympathetic to the practical difficulties
of ascertaining out-of-state representation as enunciated in Bing,
it found it insufficient as a ground for limiting a defendant's
constitutional rights. 978 Similarly, the court rejected an exception
973. Id. at 342, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
974. See, e.g., People v. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d 111, 480 N.E.2d 61, 490
N.Y.S.2d at 475 (1985) (constructive knowledge of prior representation on a
pending charge as required by Bartolomeo would only apply if police have
actual knowledge of a recent arrest on a serious charge).
975. See People v. Cawley, 150 A.D.2d 994, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st
Dep't 1989) (defendant was briefly represented on a prior charge but jumped
bail remaining a fugitive for six months and the court was asked to recognize
an exception based on the quality of the attorney-client relationship), rev'd, 76
N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990); People v. Medina,
146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1st Dep't 1989) (defendant informed
police he had been "let go" on other crimes and lower court found that police
belief in his statement was reasonable and motion to suppress was denied),
aff'd, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990); People v.
Bing, 146 A.D.2d 178, 540 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1989) (defendant had
been represented in Ohio for burglary, and was subsequently arrested in New
York for robbery and the court was asked to recognize a geographical
exception to Bartolomeo), aff'd, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
976. In Medina, the question related to the failure to adequately inquire
about prior representation. People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 345, 541
N.Y.S.2d 355, 355 (1st Dep't 1989).
977. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 344, 558 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
978. Id. at 345, 558 N.E.2d at 1019, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 482. The Court
stated: "As real as [the] practical difficulties [of out-of-state application] may
be, they are hardly a principled basis for denying a constitutional right." Id.
404 [Vol 8
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based on the attenuation of the attorney-client relationship as was
urged in Cawley.979 The court reasoned that since it was
impossible for the defendant to expressly waive his right to
counsel in the absence of his attorney, it would follow that he
could not impliedly waive it either.980 Thus, the court concluded,
recognition of these exceptions would swallow the rule as a
whole.981
Finally, in the last section, the court focused on the reasons for
abandoning the rule. In the framework of out-of-state representa-
tion as demonstrated in Bing, it noted the likely obstruction to ef-
fective law enforcement due to state variation in substantive and
procedural law. 982 As for Cawley, the court found that since he
had unquestionably, voluntarily, and knowingly waived his rights
with respect to the unrelated charge, it would press reason to its
limit to afford him an indelible right to counsel on a superficial
prior attorney-client relationship. 983
While the court recognized the need to protect individuals from
police harassment, it found the Bartolomeo rule, not only unjus-
tifiable in its social cost, 984 but unconnected to any principled ba-
sis. 985 In sum, the Bartolomeo rule is based on a fictional attor-
ney-client relationship which assumes that the attorney would not
refuse to represent his client on the subsequent unrelated
charge. 986 The court refuted this premise by noting that the deei-
979. Id. at 346, 558 N.E.2d at 1020, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 483. "If a defendant
cannot expressly reject counsel, there seems to be little legal basis for a
judicial inquiry to determine whether he has impliedly done so." Id.
980. Id.
981. Id. As for Medina, the court concluded it was bound by the factual
finding below that the police acted reasonably. However, with respect to the
question of whether the voluntariness of the defendants statements should be
submitted to the jury pursuant to CPL sections 60.45 and 710.70, the court
found that the voluntariness of the statements would not be an issue under the
Bartolomeo rule. Id. at 346-47, 558 N.E.2d at 1020, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
982. Id. at 347, 558 N.E.2d at 1020, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
983. Id.
984. Id. at 348, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484 (pointing to
Bartolomeo's troublesome effect on our jurisprudence evidenced by sharply
divided differences on how and when to apply it).
985. Id. at 348-49, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
986. Id. at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
1991] 405
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sion to retain counsel rests with the client, not the attorney, and
since the Bartolomeo defendants waived their right to counsel on
the unrelated charge, it is tantamount to not hiring a lawyer.
987
The court also refuted the argument that the Bartolomeo rule is
based on the necessity of attorney presence on the second charge
in order to determine whether the interrogation is indeed unre-
lated to the prior charge. 988 First, it noted the lack of identifica-
tion of such a basis in the Bartolomeo decision. 989 Second, it
classified the decision in People v. Rogers990 as the correct de-
marcation of a bright-line rule which serves this basis. 991
Finally, the court emphasized that the decision to permit ques-
tioning on unrelated crimes does not violate the state constitution
or ethical principles. 992 In overruling Bartolomeo, however, the
court clearly distinguished the Rogers decision, leaving it in-
tact. 993 As such, the court affirmed the orders of the appellate di-
987. Id.
988. Judge Kaye relied on this premise in her opinion. See id. at 353-54,
558 N.E.2d at 1024-25, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88 (Kaye, J., concurring as to
result in Bing and Medina, and dissenting as to Cawley) (citing People v.
Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22
(1979)).
989. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
990. 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
991. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021-22, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
484-85. The court reasoned that since the constitution refers to representation
by counsel as in civil matters, then it follows that since in a civil case an
attorney is not precluded from speaking to an adverse party about an unrelated
matter for which the party does not have representation, law enforcement
officers should not be precluded from doing so in a criminal case. Id.
992. Id. at 349-50, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
993. Id. 76 N.Y.2d at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The
court, in closing, emphasized that:
[A]lthough Rogers and Bartolomeo are frequently linked in legal
literature... the two holdings are quite different. In People v. Rogers,
the right to counsel had been invoked on the charges on which the
defendant was taken into custody and he and his counsel clearly asserted
it. . . . In People v. Bartolomeo . . . , however, defendant was taken
into custody for questioning on a new, unrelated charge. He was not
represented on that charge and freely waived his right to counsel ....
[O]ur decision today should not be understood as retreating from the
stated holding of Rogers.
406 [Vol 8
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vision with respect to People v. Bing and People v. Medina. The
order of the appellate division with respect to People v. Cawley
was reversed.
Judge Kaye wrote a separate opinion concurring with the
results as to Bing and Medina and dissenting as to Cawley. The
opinion commences with recognition of New York's carefully
planned legal development of the right to counsel based on the
perception that an attorney is the most effective safeguard against
"the awesome law enforcement machinery possessed by the
State."' 994
The first section refutes the majority's characterization of the
Bartolomeo decision as an aberrant decision marked by uncer-
tainty as to its rationale and fitness in our jurisprudence. 995 It
carefully traces the development of right to counsel cases in New
York during custodial interrogation. 99 6 The principle forwarded
by the courts in these cases was that the "attorney's presence is
the most effective means of minimizing the inherent im-
balance... [of the] accused subject to the coercive power of the
Id.
994. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 351, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486
(Kaye, J., concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and dissenting as to
Cawley) (quoting People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 207, 400 N.E.2d
360, 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (1980)).
995 Id. at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (Kaye, J.,
concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and dissenting as to Cawley).
996. See, e.g., People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400 N.E.2d
360, 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (1980) (defendant's specific request for
counsel during custodial interrogation invokes his indelible right to counsel);
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 481, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419, 420 (1976) (extending the "once-an-attorney" rule by focusing more
closely on the protection the attorney provides rather than on police awareness
of the attorney's entrance into the case); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148,
154, 193 N.E.2d 628, 631, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (1963) (statements
obtained after an attorney request to see his client has been denied or a client
request to see his attorney has been ignored will be suppressed); People v.
Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 330, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666-
67 (1968) (once an attorney enters a proceeding, police may not question the
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State. " 997
Judge Kaye continued by analyzing the decision in People v.
Taylor998 which allowed interrogation of uncounseled defendants
on unrelated charges without an attorney's presence. 999 This ex-
ception led to the occasion to subvert the right to counsel rules.
As such, Judge Kaye identified the Rogers decision as a judicial
solution to the problems created by the Taylor exception. 1000
The Rogers decision established that the "relatedness" of
pending charges would be determined by "the attorneys who
were actually representing the defendants." 1001 Furthermore,
Bartolomeo was simply a natural continuation of this principle. In
situations where the police have actual knowledge of the exis-
tence of unrelated charges, there exists a duty to inquire about
representation as to those charges.1 002 It was noted that such a
duty does not extend to situations where the police could not be
reasonably charged with knowledge that the defendant had a
lawyer on the unrelated matter.
In the second section of her opinion, Judge Kaye focused on
the specific facts of the appeals at hand in an effort to
demonstrate that overruling Bartolomeo was unnecessary. Her
conclusion was that the situations presented in Bing and Medina
were outside the scope of the Bartolomeo rule. As for Bing, she
noted that the facts could easily be distinguished from the
Bartolomeo facts. 1003 In conclusion, she advanced the notion that
based on common sense and fairness the Bartolomeo rule should
997. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486
(Kaye, J., concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and dissenting as to
Cawley) (citations omitted).
998 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
999. Id. at 331-32, 266 N.E.2d at 632-33, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
1000. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 353, 558 N.E.2d at 1024, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
1001. Id. at 354, 558 N.E.2d at 1025, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
1002. People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 231-32, 423 N.E.2d 371, 375,
440 N.Y.S.2d 894, 897 (1981).
1003. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 356-58, 558 N.E.2d at 1026-27, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
489-90. Bartolomeo dealt with a prior pending charge in the same county. In
such a situation, police ascertainment of prior pending representation is
relatively easy. Bing deals with a Nassau County burglary and the prior
pending charge is in Ohio. Id.
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be drawn at state lines. Her justification was based on the facts
that New York law enforcement would not have as much
incentive for investigating out of state charges and that
geographical differences create a natural separation that makes
inadvertent questioning on out of state charges less likely. 1004
As for Medina, she found that the facts of the case were not so
unusual as to necessitate the overruling of an important prece-
dent. Her analysis characterized Medina as a simple application
of the rule that a "confession elicited from a suspect represented
by counsel on unrelated charges" is allowed if the police reason-
ably believed those "charges were no longer pending and they
did not act in bad faith." 1005
Finally, Judge Kaye turned to Cawley. While she agreed with
the majority's position that inquiry into the substantiality of the
defendant's relationship with his lawyer would be inappropriate,
Judge Kaye focused on the fact that the police interrogated the
defendant until he confessed even though they were told to
discontinue the inquiry.10 06  As such, Cawley simply
demonstrates deliberate ignorance of the rule by law
enforcement, not the "unworkability" of the rule.
In the final section, Judge Kaye noted that the majority argu-
ments were not novel and were addressed appropriately in
Bartolomeo.1007 Specifically, the Bartolomeo majority held that
the "rule was justified as a matter of policy, was reasonable, and
did not impose an unacceptable burden on law enforcement
agencies. ' °1008 In sum, the decision to overrule a case should not
be dependent upon final accumulation of a majority of votes. 1009
1004. Id. at 357-58, 558 N.E.2d at 1027, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
1005. Id. at 358, 558 N.E.2d at 1027, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (citing People v.
Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d 111, 120-21, 480 N.E.2d 61, 68, 490 N.Y.S.2d 475, 482
(1985)).
1006. Id. at 359, 558 N.E.2d at 1028, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1007. Id. at 360, 558 N.E.2d at 1029, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
1008. Id. at 360, 558 N.E.2d at 1028, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1009. Judge Jones authored the Bartolomeo decision in which Chief Judge
Cooke and Judges Fuchsberg and Meyers concurred. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d
at 240, 423 N.E.2d at 379, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 902. Judge Wachtler wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Judges Jasen and Gabrielli concurred. Id.
The Bing decision was authored by Judge Simons; Chief Judge Wachtler and
19911 409
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Additionally, the recurrence of Bartolomeo issues was not a
signal of demise but a natural progression of the judicial process
which constantly refines recent precedents.' 01 0 As for majority
claims of "destabilization," Judge Kaye concluded that it was
more likely that destabilization will be caused by nonadherence to
the doctrine of stare decisis. 1011
In reaching their respective decisions, both the majority and the
dissent relied entirely on interpretation of the right to counsel as
guaranteed by the state constitution. However, both mentioned
the less expansive protection offered by the Federal Constitution
in similar settings. 1012
The fifth and sixth amendments guarantee an accused the right
to counsel. The sixth amendment serves to ensure fairness
throughout the criminal process by expressly providing for the
right to counsel. 10 13 Additionally, Supreme Court interpretation
of the fifth amendment has developed a right to counsel
specifically aimed at protecting the right against compulsory self-
incrimination. 10 14
During custodial interrogation, judicial interpretation of the
fifth amendment requires the police to cease all questioning, in-
cluding questioning with respect to unrelated matters, once the
accused has requested counsel. Similarly in New York, further
communication with the accused is forbidden once he has re-
quested or retained counsel. However, in such a situation, the
Supreme Court allows waiver in the absence of counsel subse-
quent to attorney request or retention if the accused voluntarily
Judges Hancock and Bellacosa concurred. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 361, 558
N.E.2d at 1029, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Judge Kaye concurred in result and
authored a separate opinion in which Judges Alexander and Titone concurred.
Id.
1010. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 360, 558 N.E.2d at 1028-29, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
491-92.
1011. Id. at 360, 558 N.E.2d at 1029, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
1012. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 338-39, 351, 558 N.E.2d at 1014-15, 1023, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 477-78, 486.
1013. See Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in
Confession Contexts, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 975, 980-82 (1986).
1014. Id. at 988 n.50.
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initiates further communication with police. 10 15 In contrast, New
York has instituted a per se rule based on its own state consti-
tution which forbids further questioning and elicitation of volun-
tary waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of counsel.
Therefore, an individual cannot freely choose to waive the right
to counsel without his or her attorney's presence subsequent to an
earlier request or retention of counsel.
Bartolomeo further expanded such protection by imputing a re-
quest or retention of counsel with respect to an earlier pending
charge to a subsequent arrest on an unrelated charge. As a result,
although the Bing decision has negated this recent expansion,
New York continues to provide greater protection for the un-
charged individual subject to custodial interrogation in the context
of a single arrest.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Margan 10 16
(decided April 23, 1990)
A criminal defendant contended that his constitutional right to
the presence of counsel was violated during trial when the court
proceeded with the direct examination of a state witness in the
absence of defense counsel. The court held that proceeding with
the direct examination of a witness, in the absence of defense
counsel, may not be considered harmless error under either the
federal1 0 17 or state10 18 constitutions. 1019
1015. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). "An accused . . .
having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
1016. 157 A.D.2d 64, 554 N.Y.S.2d 676 (2d Dep't 1990).
1017. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1018. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
1019. Margan, 157 A.D.2d at 69, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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